

Findings Annihilator(s) via Fault Injection Attack (FIA) on Boolean Function of Grain v0

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Abstract. In developing stream cipher algorithms, Boolean function is one of vital elements. Attacks on LFSR-based stream cipher is the challenge for the cryptanalyst to get low-degree annihilator(s). In this paper, we proposed Fault Injection Attack (FIA) on Boolean function of Grain v0, which is the original variant of Grain family algorithm. Fault injection attack (FIA) is used on Boolean function of Grain v0 by replacing certain coefficient with value of one (1) which results in the generation of several injected Boolean functions. With these injected Boolean function, we proceed using HAO's algorithm to find annihilator(s). As a result, we obtained several new annihilator(s) of Grain v0's Boolean function. This new annihilator(s) will be utilized to launch algebraic attacks upon Grain v0.

1. Introduction

Cryptology is science that incorporates both cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography is divided into two types, which are symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography. In symmetric cryptography, only one key namely secret key will be used to encrypting and decrypting the data. Meanwhile for the asymmetric cryptography, a key pair will be used to encrypting and decrypting the data which namely public key and private key. The symmetric cryptography can be divided into two types symmetric cipher, which are block cipher and stream cipher. In stream cipher, we have three (3) class [1];

I. The one-time pad

1. **Definition** Let Vernam cipher over the binary alphabet is defined by $c_i = m_i \oplus k_i$ for $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$, where m_i

II. Synchronous Stream Ciphers

2. **Definition** A synchronous stream cipher is one in which the keystream is generated independently of the plaintext message and of the ciphertext.




Figure 1: General model of a synchronous stream cipher

In a synchronous stream cipher a stream of pseudo-random digits is generated independently of the plaintext and ciphertext messages, and then combined with the plaintext (to encrypt) or the ciphertext (to decrypt) (refer to Figure 1). In the most common form, binary digits are used (bits), and the keystream is combined with the plaintext using the exclusive or operation (XoR). This is termed a binary additive stream cipher (refer to Figure 2).




Figure 2: General model of a binary additive stream cipher (above)

In a synchronous stream cipher, the sender and receiver must be exactly in step for decryption to be successful. If digits are added or removed from the message during transmission, synchronisation is lost. To restore synchronisation, various offsets can be tried systematically to obtain the correct decryption. Another approach is to tag the ciphertext with markers at regular points in the output.

III. Self-synchronous stream ciphers

3. **Definition** A self-synchronous or asynchronous stream cipher is one in which the keystream is generated as function of the key and a fixed number of previous ciphertext digits.

The encryption function of self-synchronous stream cipher can be described by the equations:

$$\sigma_i = (c_{i-b}, c_{i-b+1}, \dots, c_{i-1}) \quad (1)$$

$$z_i = g(\sigma_i, k) \quad (2)$$

$$c_i = h(z_i, m_i) \quad (3)$$

where $\sigma_i = (c_{i-b}, c_{i-b+1}, \dots, c_{i-1})$ is the initial state, k (non-secret) g is the function which produces the key stream, z_i and h is the output function which combines the keystream and plaintext m_i to produces ciphertext c_i . Please refer to Figure 3.

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


Figure 3: General model of a self-synchronous stream cipher

For each type of ciphers, it has their own types of attacks. For example of the symmetric stream cipher, there are many types of attacks such as:

1. Algebraic Attack
2. Exhaustive Search Attack
3. Correlation Attack
4. Fault Attack (including Fault Injection)
5. Distinguishing Attack
6. Chosen-IV attack
7. Slide Attack
8. Cube Attack
9. Guess and Determine Attack

In this paper, we will focus more on symmetric stream cipher namely Fault Injection Attack (FIA), which is specifically for Boolean function of stream cipher algorithm.

2. Description of Grain v0

Stream cipher can be classified into two types, which are synchronous stream ciphers, and asynchronous stream ciphers also known as self-synchronous stream ciphers.

Grain is a stream cipher primitive that was designed by Hell *et al* in 2007 to be very easy and small to implement in hardware. Grain v0 is a bit oriented synchronous stream cipher and the key stream is generated independently from plain text and was designed based on two shift registers, one (1) with linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and one with nonlinear feedback shift register (NFSR). Both shift registers are 80-bits, the key size is 80-bits and the IV size is 64-bits. Grain v0 consists of LFSR denoted by

$$s_i, s_{i+1}, \dots, s_{i+79} \quad (4)$$

and NFSR is denoted by

$$b_i, b_{i+1}, \dots, b_{i+79}. \quad (5)$$

Meanwhile LFSR function denoted as:

$$f(x) = 1 + x^{18} + x^{29} + x^{42} + x^{57} + x^{67} + x^{80} \quad (6)$$

and to remove any possible ambiguity, update function of the LFSR is defined as:

$$s_{i+80} = s_{i+62} + s_{i+51} + s_{i+38} + s_{i+23} + s_{i+13} + s_i \quad (7)$$

NFSR of Grain v0, $g(x)$ is defined as:

$$g(x) = 1 + x^{17} + x^{20} + x^{28} + x^{35} + x^{43} + x^{47} + x^{52} + x^{59} + x^{65} + x^{71} + x^{80} + x^{17}x^{20} + x^{43}x^{47} + x^{65}x^{71} + x^{20}x^{28}x^{35} + x^{47}x^{52}x^{59} + x^{17}x^{35}x^{52}x^{71} + x^{20}x^{28}x^{43}x^{47} + x^{17}x^{20}x^{59}x^{65} + x^{17}x^{20}x^{28}x^{35}x^{43} + x^{47}x^{52}x^{59}x^{65}x^{71} + x^{28}x^{35}x^{43}x^{47}x^{52}x^{59} \quad (8)$$

and to remove any possible ambiguity, update function of the NFSR is defined as:

$$b_{i+80} = s_i + b_{i+63} + b_{i+60} + b_{i+52} + b_{i+45} + b_{i+37} + b_{i+33} + b_{i+28} + b_{i+21} + b_{i+15} + b_{i+9} + b_i + b_{i+63}b_{i+60} + b_{i+37}b_{i+33} + b_{i+15}b_{i+9} + b_{i+60}b_{i+52}b_{i+45} + b_{i+33}b_{i+28}b_{i+21} + b_{i+63}b_{i+45}b_{i+28}b_{i+9} +$$

$$b_{i+60}b_{i+52}b_{i+37}b_{i+33} + b_{i+63}b_{i+60}b_{i+21}b_{i+15} + b_{i+63}b_{i+60}b_{i+52}b_{i+45}b_{i+37} + b_{i+33}b_{i+28}b_{i+21}b_{i+15}b_{i+9} + b_{i+52}b_{i+45}b_{i+37}b_{i+33}b_{i+28}b_{i+21} \quad (9)$$




Figure 4: Grain v0 diagram.

Figure 4 show diagram of both two shift registers represent state of h algorithm. Four (4) variables taken from LFSR and one (1) variable en from NFSR as input to a Boolean function, $h(x)$. This function has algebraic degree 3. This Boolean function is defined as:

$$h(x) = x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 \quad (10)$$

where the variables x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 and x_4 corresponds to the tap positions of $s_{i+3}, s_{i+25}, s_{i+46}, s_{i+64}$ and b_{i+63} respectively. Output of this filter function is masked with the bit, b_i from the NFSR to produce keystream.

3. Basic study on Boolean function

4 Definition (Boolean function) A Boolean function f on n variables is a mapping from $\{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}$.

5 Definition (Algebraic normal form (ANF) of Boolean function) Every Boolean function f can be expressed as a multivariate polynomial over F_2 . This polynomial is known as algebraic normal form of the Boolean function h . The general form of algebraic normal form of h is given by:

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = a_0 \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i \leq n} a_i x_i \oplus \bigoplus_{1 \leq i < j \leq n} a_{ij} x_i x_j \oplus \dots \oplus a_{12 \dots n} x_1 x_2 \dots x_n.$$

6 Definition (Degree of Boolean function) Degree of a Boolean function h is defined as $deg(h)$ = number of variables in the highest order product term in the algebraic normal form of h . Functions of degree at most one are called affine function. An affine function with constant term equal to zero is called linear function. For example, Grain v0's Boolean function has $deg(h) = 3$.

7 Definition (Annihilator of a Boolean function) A non-zero Boolean function g of n -variables is said to be an annihilator of a Boolean function f iff $g(X) \cdot f(X) = 0, \forall X \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

4. Definition of our Fault Injection Attack (FIA) on Grain v0's Boolean Function

The attacker is assumed able to inject exactly one bit (1 or 0) in any one of active coefficients in the Boolean function [3][4]. In Grain v0, Boolean function is defined as:

$$h(x) = x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$$

This paper will inject value of one (1) in each active coefficients of Grain v0's Boolean function. For example, in Grain v0's Boolean function, we get nineteen (19) active coefficients such as below:

1. x_0
2. x_1
3. x_2
4. x_3

5. x_4
6. x_0x_1
7. x_0x_2
8. x_0x_3
9. x_0x_4
10. x_1x_2
11. x_1x_4
12. x_2x_3
13. x_2x_4
14. x_3x_4
15. $x_0x_1x_2$
16. $x_0x_2x_3$
17. $x_0x_2x_4$
18. $x_1x_2x_4$
19. $x_2x_3x_4$

With these nineteen ($i=19$) active coefficients so we have nineteen (19) new injected Boolean function. So let new injected Boolean function defined as $h_i(x)$. From all new derived Boolean function, we will use HAO's algorithm to find annihilator(s) of the current/injected Boolean function. For example, we inject with bit-1 into active coefficients x_0 so we will get from;

$$\begin{aligned}
 h(x) &= x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + \\
 & x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4 \\
 \Rightarrow & x_1 + x_4 + x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4
 \end{aligned}$$

5. HAO's Method

From Courtois and Meier, the key step of algebraic attack (stream cipher) is to build low-degree over-defined equations, and this method can be enhanced to find low-degree annihilator(s) of combination of the keystream generator [5]. In HAO's paper, there is three (3) algorithms/methods to find annihilator(s) of the given Boolean function [6].

In this paper, we will use **algorithm 2** in HAO's algorithm to find annihilator of the injected Grain v0's Boolean function. We will consider all the n -variable non-zero monomials of degree $\leq d$, denoted by $A_d = \{1, x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, x_1x_2, x_1x_3, x_2x_3, x_1x_4, x_2x_4, x_3x_4, \dots, x_{n-1}x_n, \dots, x_{n-d+1}x_n, \dots, x_{n-d+2}\dots x_n\} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_r\} (r = \sum_{i=0}^d C_n^i)$. Let $V_n = \{0, 1\}^n = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_r\}$, where $r = 2^n$ and the ordering among the vectors is considered in lexicographic ordering.

Then, we denote $C = \{p \bullet h \mid p \in A_d\} = \{hp_1, hp_2, hp_3, \dots, hp_r\}$. For any $h \in B_n$, we denote it by a 2^n -tuple vector $\{h_1, h_2, h_3, \dots, h_{2^n}\}$.

For example, Boolean function for Grain v0 is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 h(x) &= x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 \\
 &+ x_2x_3x_4
 \end{aligned}$$

can be represented by **(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)**.

Algorithm 2 (as in [6]) is defined as below:

Algorithm Given a n -variable Boolean function h , find all annihilator(s) of h with degree $\leq d$.

Step 1: Construct matrix $M_d(h)$.

Step 2: Convert $M_d(h)$ into row ladder matrix $M_d(h)^*$ using Gaussian elimination.

Step 3: If there exists zero-rows in $M_d(h)^*$, it certainly exists a annihilator g of h , and obtain g by using the inverse procession of Step 2, or else, there is no annihilator of h with degree $\leq d$.

Theorem 1 $|C| < |A_d| \Rightarrow$ There exists at least one (1) annihilator of h with degree $\leq d$.

Proof. $|C| < |A_d| \Leftrightarrow \exists p_1, p_2 \in A_d$ with $p_1 \neq p_2$ such that $p_1 \bullet h = p_2 \bullet h \Leftrightarrow h \bullet (p_1 + p_2) = 0 \Rightarrow p_1 + p_2$ is an annihilator of h with degree $\leq d$.

Theorem 2 There exists annihilator of h with degree $\leq d \Leftrightarrow \text{rank}(M_d(h)) < |A_d|$.

Proof. There exists annihilator g of h with degree $\leq d \Leftrightarrow h(x) \bullet g(x) = 0$ for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^n \Leftrightarrow$ The sum of rows in $M_d(h)$ corresponding to the terms of g is zero $\Leftrightarrow \text{rank}(M_d(h)) < \text{The number of rows in } M_d(h) \Leftrightarrow \text{rank}(M_d(h)) < |A_d|$.

6. Analysis

The adversary is assumed able to inject exactly one bit (bit 1) into any one of active coefficients in the Boolean function. In this paper, we will inject value of one (bit-1) into Grain v0's Boolean function. All new injected Boolean function is defined as Table 1:

No. ($h_i(x)$)	Coefficients	Injected Boolean Function
0	-	$x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
1	x_0	$x_1 + x_4 + x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
2	x_1	$I + x_4 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4$
3	x_2	$x_1 + x_3 + x_4 + x_0x_1 + x_0x_4 + x_1x_4$
4	x_3	$x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4$
5	x_4	$x_1 + x_3 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3$
6	x_0x_1	$x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
7	x_0x_2	$x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
8	x_0x_3	$x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + I + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
9	x_0x_4	$x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
10	x_1x_2	$x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
11	x_1x_4	$x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
12	x_2x_3	$I + x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4$
13	x_2x_4	$x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_3$
14	x_3x_4	$x_1 + x_2 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4$
15	$x_0x_1x_2$	$I + x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
16	$x_0x_2x_3$	$I + x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
17	$x_0x_2x_4$	$I + x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
18	$x_1x_2x_4$	$I + x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_2x_3x_4$
19	$x_2x_3x_4$	$I + x_1 + x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_2x_3 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_1x_2x_4$

Table 1: List of Injected Grain v0's Boolean function (above).

$(h_i(x))$	$(h_i(x))$ in vector
0	(0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
1	(0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
2	(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
3	(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0)

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14	00000111100000010001000000010000 0100000001010001100001100110000 00100000010011010001000100000000 0000000100100010000001000000100110 0000100000010100000110101010100 0000010000000000110000000000000 0000001000000000001000000010000 000000010000000001010100000100101 0000000010000000010010000000000 00000000000000001000001000010000 0000000000100000100000010000011 00000000000000000000000000001011 0000000000000000000000001001100110 000000000000000000000000100001010000 00000000000000000000000010000011
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16	10100100100001011000100101000000 0100001011000000010011100000010100 00000000000010001100001110010010 00010000001001100000100100000000 000010000001001100001100100000000 00000000000000001100000000001001 00000001000000001001000000010000 00000000000000000010000000000001 000000000000000000010100000010100 00000000000000000000000001000010000 00000000000000000000000010000100001 000000000000000000000000110011001 0000000000000000000000001001000010000 0000000000000000000000001010000000000 00000000000000000000000010000100001 000000000000000000000000100100010000 00000000000000000000000010010000110 000000000000000000000000100001000000 00000000000000000000000010010000010
17	10100100100001011001000101000000 0100001011000000010000100000010100 00000000000010001100001110100010 00010000001001100000100100000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000

	<pre> 00000000000010010000010100010100 000000000000000000111000000011001 00000001000000000001100000010000 0000000000000000000100000000100101 0000000000000000000010000000000100 00000000000000000001000001000000000 0000000000000000000100001000000000 00000000000010000000000110011001 000000000000000000000001001100010 00000000000000000000000001010000 0000000000000000010000010010000111 </pre>
18	<pre> 10100100100001011001100001000000 01000010110000001000110000000100 00000000000010001100001010110010 00010000001001101000100000000000 0000100010010010100001000001100100 00000000000010010000110000010100 00000000000000001110000000011001 00000001000000000001000000000000 000000000000000000010000000010000 000000000000000000010100000010100 00000000000000000001000001100010000 0000000000000000000110000000011001 00000001000000000001000000000000 000000000000000000010000000010000 0000000000000000000101000000100100 00000000000000000001001100100 0000000000000000000100101010000 000000000000000001000001001000001 </pre>
19	<pre> 10100100100001011001100100000000 01000010110000001000110000010000 00000000000010001100001110110000 00010000001001101000100101000000 00001000100101000001000000100110 000000000000100100001101010100 00000000000000001110000000001000 00000001000000000001000000010100 000000000000000000010000000100101 00000000000000000001010000000000 00000000000000000001000000000000 0000000000000000000100001000010010 0000000000000000000100001000000011 00000000000010000000000110001011 000000000000000000000001000100110 0000000000000000000000001000001000 0000000000000000000000001000001000 000000000000000000010000010011000011 </pre>

Table 3: Output of $M_d(h)$ (above).

From Table 3, we convert $M_d(h)$ into row ladder matrix - $M_d(h)^*$ using Gaussian elimination. For this purpose, we are using Maple 18 (with command: **ReducedRowEchelonForm(x)**). As for the output of $M_d(h)^*$ show as in Table 4.

$h_i(x)$	$M_d(h_i)^*$
0	<pre> 0000010110000001000110000010100 01000000000010001100001110110010 0000000001001101000100100000000 0000000100101000001000001100110 0000100000010010000110100010100 000001000000000111000000001001 00000000000000000001000000010000 0000000100000000100000000100001 0000000010000000010100000000100 0000000001000001000001000010000 0000000000100000100001000010000 0000000000100000100001000000001 00000000000000000000000110001001 0000000000001000000001001100110 000000000000100000100001010000 00000000000000000000010010000011 </pre>
1	<pre> 0100000001110000000000010000000 0001000000100000000000000000000 0000100000010100000000000000000 000001000000000100001/20000-1/21/21/200 00 00000001000000000-1001/200001/21/2-1/2000 000 0000000010000000010100000000100 0000000000010000000000000000000 </pre>

	<pre> 000000000000000010000000010000000 000000000000000001100-1/200001/2-1/21/2001 001 0000000000000000000001000000010000 000000000000000000000001000000000 0000000000000000000000000100000000 00000000000000000000000000010000000 000000000000000000000000000001000000 00000000000000000000000000000010 00000000000000000000000000000000 </pre>
2	<pre> 01000000011100000000000100000000 00010000001000000000000000000000 000010000001010000000000000000000000 000100000000100001/20000-1/21/21/20000 000000010000000000-1001/200001/21/2-1/2000 000 0000000010000000010100000000100 00000000000010000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000001100-1/200001/2-1/2001 000 0000000000000000000001000000010000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000001100-1/200001/2-1/2001 000 0000000000000000000001000000010000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000010 00000000000000000000000000000000 </pre>
3	<pre> 100001011000010000000-10000000000 01000001110000000000010000000000 001000000001000110000100011-101-1 000100010000010000000000000000000 000010001000010000000000000000000 000000010000000001110000000001001 000000000010000010000100001000010000 00000000000100000100001000000001 00000000000000000000000110001001 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 </pre>
4	<pre> 01000100001000000000000000010000 0001000000100010000000001000-2000 00001000100000100000000000001000 00000001000000000000000000001000 000000000100000100000001/20-1-1/200-1/2-1/20 00000000000100000000000100000000 000000000000100000000001/2001/2-101/21/20 1/20 0000000000000100000100001010000 0000000000000000000100000000001000 00000000000000000000100000000-1000 0000000000000000000001000000010000 00000000000000000000000001000 00000000000000000000000001-1/2011/2101/21/20 1/20 000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000 </pre>
5	<pre> 10000100000000000000000000000000 0100010001000000000000000000010000 00100000010001000000000000001000-20000 000000100000000000000000000010000 0000000100000000000000000000000000 000000010000000001/200-10001/200000 000000001000000000000000000000000 000000000100000001/200000-1/200000 00000000000100000000000000010001000 0000000000001000000001001100110 000000000000000100000000000000010000 0000000000000000010-1/20010001/200001 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000 </pre>
6	<pre> 01000000010100000000001001/2-1/2-101-2 </pre>

	00100000010011000000001000-10110 00001000000101100000001000-11311 000001000000000000-10000000-1111/2 1/2 00000010000000000-100000001/2-1/201 1/21/2 0000000100000000001000000-1/21/20000 0000000010000000010000000010100 0000000000010000000000000001/21/20000 00000000000000001011000000-1/23/20-1- 1/2-1/2 0000000000000000001000000001/2-1/20001 000000000000000000000000100000010-1-10 0000000000000000000000001000000-1-10-1 0000000000000000000000001000010000 0000000000000000000000000010011001 0000000000000000000000000010-10110
7	0001000100001010000000001000000 0000000000100000100001010000000 0000000000000000000010000000000 0000000000000000000001000000000 0000000000000000000000100000000 0000000000000000000000001000000 00000000000000000000000000100000 000000000000000000000000000010000 00000000000000000000000000001000 0000000000000000000000000000100 000000000000000000000000000010 000000000000000000000000000001 000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000
8	101101000000000001000100001010-1-10 01000011010000001000100000001100 0000100000010000000000000100011-1 0000000010000000010000000000000 0000000000100000100000000-1000-1/2-1 1/2 0000000000001000000000000-1000-1/2-1 -1/2 000000000000010000000000000-101/20- 1/2 00000000000000100000100001010000 0000000000000000001000000000001/20 1/2 0000000000000000000001000000001000 0000000000000000000100000010000 000000000000000000000100000-1000 1/2 00000000000000000000000010010101/21- 1/2 000000000000000000000000100000010 000000000000000000000000110001/21 1/2 000000000000000000000000010000
9	01000000010100000000001001-3/2-1-1/2 3/2-3/2 00100000010011000000001001-10010 00001000000101100000001000310-10 000001000000000000-1-10000011-100 0000001000000000001100000010000 00000001000000000010000001-1/201/21/2 1/2 000000001000000000-100000001/201/2- 1/2-1/2 000000000001000000000000000-1/20-1/2 1/2-1/2 00000000000000000100000000-1100-10 0000000000000000001000000001/201/2-1/2 1/2 00000000000000000111000000-1/201/21/2 1/2 00000000000000000000000100000-2-1110 00000000000000000000000010001-10010 000000000000000000000000010011001 000000000000000000000000001010000
10	1000010100000000000100000011101 01000100000000000000000001/21/20-101/2

	-3/2 00000010000000000000010001-1/21/2-1/20- 1/21/21/2 00000000100000000001000-10000100 000000000100000000-100000001/20-1/20 0 00000000001000000000000001/21/20001/2 1/2 0000000000010000000000000011001 00000000000010000010000-11/2-1/2001- 1/2-1/2 00000000000001000000001000000 00000000000000010010000-11/2-1/21/20 1/2-1/2-1/2 0000000000000000010000000011001 00000000000000000001000001000000 0000000000000000000010000-1-100-1 000000000000000000000101-1/21/20001/2 1/2 0000000000000000000000101000000
11	01000000010100000000000021/21011/21/2 1/2 00100000010011000000000201-22102 00001000000101100000000-2001100 000001000000000000-100001/2-1/20-13/2 1/201 000000100000000000100000000000 000000100000000001000001/21001/2-1/2 -1/2 00000001000000000-100001/2-10-11/21 1/21/2 00000000010000000000000001/20001/21/2 1/2 000000000000000001000000-1-1-11-1-10-1 00000000000000000010000000-1/2000-1/2 1/21/2 000000000000000000110000-1/2102-1/20- 1/2-1/2 000000000000000000001000-1101-100-1 0000000000000000000010011000001 000000000000000000000001001100100 000000000000000000000110001001
12	111000000000000110000-100000-20-5-4- 2 000100010010000010000000010-20-2-10 000100000010001000000000000210 000001000100100100000100000-10-5-5- 2 0000001000000000100000000000-4-3-2 00000000100000000000010000000-10 00000000000001000000001001000210 00000000000000100000000001010100 000000000000000010000000000211 0000000000000000000100000000-10-4-4- 2 0000000000000000000001000000000-3-4-2 0000000000000000000000100000010442 00000000000000000000000100010110 000000000000000000000000000010000111 000000000000000000000000000100-100 000000000000000000000000000001221
13	0100000000110001000000010000-40-1 00010001001010000001000000000010 0000100000010000000110001000-210 0000010000000001000000000001/2-1- 1/2 00000001000000000110000000-3/211/2 00000000010000010000000000-110 000000000000010000010001000-100 000000000000010000010011000011 00000000000000010000000000001 00000000000000000100000000003/2-1- 1/2 00000000000000000000001000000010 000000000000000000000001000002-10 000000000000000000000000000100100 00000000000000000000000000010100

	0000000000000000000000000000000001-2 2 1
14	01000000010100000000-101-101000-1/2- 3/2 00100000010011000000001001-2011 0 0000100000010100000010100000100 0 0000100000000000-10-100000-1001/2- 1/2 0000001000000000001000000010000 00000001000000000010000-101001-1/2- 1/2 000000001000000000-10100100-1001 1 000000000100000000-1000000001/2- 1/2 00000000000001000001001000001 00000000000000100000000-1-110-1-10 000000000000000010001001000001/2 3/2 000000000000000000110000-100100-1-1 0 0000000000000000000100001010000 000 00000000000000000001001100110 00000 000000000000000000000001011
15	101001001000010000010-101000100-1/2 1/2 010000101100000000001000000001-2 000100000010011000000001000-1001-1 00001000100101000001000000010000 00000001000000001001000000010000 0000000000001000000000010000001/2- 3/2 0000000000000000100000100000-1001/2- 1/2 0000000000000000000100000000000001 000000000000000000001000000000001-2 0000000000000000000001000000100-11 0000000000000000000000001000010000 00000000000000000000000001001001/2 1/2 00000000000000000000000000010-1001-1 0000000000000000000000000001-10000 000000000000000000000000000010-1
16	101001001000010000000-101000-2 5/12- 3/2 -11/12 -1/6 010000101100000000000100000-1 4/3 1- 1/3 2/3 000100000010011000000001000-2 4/3 0- 1/3 2/3 0000100010010100000000000000-4/3 0 4/3 -2/3 000000010000000000000000000010000 00000000000010000000000100003/4-1/2- 1/4 -1/2 00000000000000001000001000000-1/4 1/2 3/4 1/2 000000000000000000010000000001-1/6 0 1/6 -1/3 00000000000000000001000000000-1/6 0 1/6 2/3 0000000000000000000100000000-1 1/2 0 1/2 0 00000000000000000000100000000-2/3 0 2/3 -1/3 0000000000000000000010000001-1/2 0- 1/2 0 000000000000000000000100000-2/3 0 2/3 -1/3 0000000000000000000000000001000 1/4 1/2 1/4 1/2 0000000000000000000000000100 1/2 1 1/2 0 00000000000000000000000000010 5/6 0-5/6 2/3
17	101001001000010000010-10100000 4-7/2 5/2 01000010110000000000010000000-1 3/2- 3/2 000100000010011000000001000001-1/2 1/2 000010001001010000010000000001-1/2 1/2 00000001000000000001100000000-3 2-2 00000000000010000000000100000-2 1-2 00000000000000010000010000000010

	00000000000000000001000000000000-1 1/2- 1/2 000000000000000000010000000000-1 1/2- 1/2 000000000000000000010000000000100 000000000000000000000000010000001-1/2 1/2 000000000000000000000000010000101 00000000000000000000000000001000-3 2-2 00000000000000000000000000000010 0 2-1/2 3/2 000000000000000000000000000000010 3-2 2 00000000000000000000000000000001-2 1 0
18	101001001000010000010-100000-2 3/2 0-1 3/2 010000101100000000000100000-2 9/4 3/2- 3/2 11/4 0001000000100110000000000000-2 9/4 1/2- 3/2 11/4 0000100010010100000100000000-1/4 1/2 1/2 1/4 0000000100000000000100000000000 00000000000010000000000000000 5/4 1/2- 1/2 3/4 00000000000000001000001000000 1/4 1/2- 1/2 3/4 00000000000000000100000000001-3/4 -1/2 1/2 -5/4 00000000000000000001000000000 1/4 -1/2 1/2 3/4 0000000000000000000001000000000 3/2 1-1 3/2 00000000000000000000010000001-3/2 0 1- 3/2 0000000000000000000000000100000-1/4 1/2 1/2 1/4 000000000000000000000000000000010 0 0 10-1 1 00000000000000000000000000000001000-1/4 -1/2 1/2 1/4 0000000000000000000000000000000100 1/2 0 0 1/2 0000000000000000000000000000010 -1/4 1/2- 1/2 -3/4
19	101001001000010000010-1010-10-2 0 1 2 010000101100000000000100000-10000 00010000001001100000000001010-20000 00001000100101000001000000000010 000000010000000000010000000100-2-3 000000000000100000000001000000-1-1 00000000000000000100000100010000-1-2 0000000000000000000100000000000 00000000000000000100000000000001 0000000000000000000100000000-10000 000000000000000000010000000000010000 00000000000000000000010000000010 000000000000000000000000000000010 00000000000000000000000000000002 3 00000000000000000000000000000001000-2-3 0000000000000000000000000000000100-1 00000000000000000000000000000001 2 3

Table 4: Output of $M_d(h)^*$ (after Gaussian Elimination) (above).

7. Result

From Table 4, we can get that original Boolean function of Grain v0 do not produce any zero row in $M_d(h)^*$, that mean, it do not have any annihilator. Meanwhile only six (6) active coefficients in injected Boolean function produced zero row in $M_d(h)^*$. All involved coefficients are as in Table 5. We bold the row zero of each $M_d(h)^*$ in Table 4. As for the result, all involved coefficients are as in Table 5 and we manage to obtained several annihilators using Fault Injection Attack (FAI) with HAO's algorithm.

Zero row	Coefficients
0 row	x_0x_i

	x_0x_3 x_0x_4 x_1x_2 x_1x_4 x_2x_3 x_2x_4 x_3x_4 $x_0x_1x_2$ $x_0x_2x_3$ $x_0x_2x_4$ $x_1x_2x_4$ $x_2x_3x_4$
1 row	x_0, x_1, x_2, x_4
2 rows	x_3
4 rows	x_0x_2

Table 5: Output of Zero row (above).

From step 3 in Algorithm 2, we manage to get annihilator via injection of coefficient x_1, x_2 and x_4 . Refer to Table 6 below:

Coefficients	Annihilator(s)
x_1	$x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_4$
x_2	$x_0x_4 + x_2x_4$
x_4	$x_0x_1 + x_1x_2$

Table 6: Output of annihilator(s) (above).

For the result comparison in this paper, by using only HAO's algorithm we do not obtained any annihilator. However, when we are using HAO's algorithm + FIA, we manage to obtain at least one (1) annihilator. Refer to Table 7 below:

	HAO's	HAO's + FIA
Annihilator(s)	NO	YES
No. of Annihilator(s)	ZERO ANINIHILATOR	THREE ANINIHILATORS
Advantage(s)	NO	REDUCE DEGREE OF ALGEBRAIC ATTACK

Table 7: Comparison between finding annihilator(s) using only HAO's algorithm and FIA+HAO's algorithm (above).

8. Conclusion

According to HAO, their proposed algorithm can effectively calculate all low-degree annihilators of both h and $h+1$ and subsequently construct low-degree overdefined algebraic equations. But from this study, it has been found that annihilator(s) of Grain's Boolean function can be obtained only by using Fault Injection Attack (FIA) with HAO's algorithm as shown in Table 6. However, the same algorithm without FIA could not retrieve any annihilator of original Grain v0's Boolean function. This finding has concluded that HAO's algorithm is not applicable in all Boolean function based stream cipher to find an annihilator. So with our attack (HAO's algorithm + FIA), it managed to obtained annihilator(s) and help cryptanalyst to do an algebraic attack to the Boolean function based stream cipher. We also do a comparison between of this two (2) methodologies as shown in Table 7. This low-degree annihilator(s) will used to construct low-degree overdefined algebraic equations and to be utilized in algebraic attacks. For future research, we will using the same methodology to do analysis and attack to another Boolean function based stream cipher.

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