Game Equilibrium of False Information Diffusion in Public Crisis on Interpersonal Network

¹ Foreign Affairs Center of Ministry Industry and Information Technology Beijing, China
² School of Economics and management Yanshan University Qinghuangdao, China

^a Corresponding author: likaigary@163.com

Abstract

The public crisis evolution will make a variety of impact on society, the public and the mass media will also focus on public crisis. In the evolution of public crisis, objective and non-objective information about the crisis will arise. Such harmful but not objective information is “false information”. Various factors working together lead to the false information diffusion in public crisis. We will identify eight factors inducing false information in public crisis, and study the game equilibrium process of false information diffusion in public crisis on interpersonal network, and determine the equilibrium which was looked for. When the public identify that their interests are lower than the equilibrium, the false information is accepted, then false information on this node begins diffusing; When the public identify that their interests are higher than the equilibrium, the false information is identified, then diffusion on this node ends.